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An Econometric Analysis of Unconventional Monetary Policy: 
The Cases of Japan and United States 
Tsubasa Shibata† Hiroyuki Kosaka‡ 
March 14, 2018 
Abstract 
In the wake of financial crisis, the use by major advanced countries of unconventional 
monetary policies, such as credit easing (CE) by central banks toward depository banks 
as well as quantitative easing (QE), is not without controversy. While QE increases the 
liability side of the central bank's balance sheet by expanding the monetary base, the new 
phase of CE policy enlarges the asset side by purchasing different types of credit in order 
to get credit markets functioning. Nevertheless, many studies have not taken this 
important difference in policy into account. They have shed light on mechanisms of the 
determination of interest rate but precluded any endogenous movement of items in the 
balance sheets of central banks. Instead, this paper attempts to construct a financial model, 
linked to a macro-econometric model, which reflects the central bank’s balance sheet. 
The two linked models provide a better guide to explaining how a central bank’s monetary 
policy generates impacts on the real economy via depository banks. By undertaking a 
comparative assessment of the cases of Japan and the USA, this study conducts scenario 
simulation using the two linked models. It thereby offers an alternative solution to current 
monetary policy that aims to tackle the problem of deflation. 
Keywords: Unconventional monetary policy, financial market, macro-econometric model. 
JEL Codes: E10, E17, E44, E52 
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1. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis in 2008 nearly sent the world economy into a depression. To forestall 
such a calamitous event, central banks and monetary authorities in major advanced economies, such 
as Japan, USA, European Union, and Britain, implemented policies to lower their interest rates so 
drastically as to approximate a zero lower bound point. In principle, when the interest rate is lower 
zero bound, the economy is assumed to fall into a liquidity trap (Hicks, 1937). Despite these bold, if 
desperate, monetary policies, many economies could not avoid or overcome severe downturns. It 
appeared that the monetary policy tool of simply lowering interest rates, based on traditional monetary 
theory, was in practice not sufficiently effective for achieving the objectives of central banks. Under 
the circumstances of severely ailing money markets, the central banks were compelled to adopt 
unconventional instruments to expand the overall money supply. 
 
By definition, an unconventional monetary policy can be any policy introduced by a central bank 
in a situation where the policy interest rate is lower zero bound or nearly so (Miyao, 2006). Some 
years before the crisis developed, Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) and Bernanke et al. (2004) suggested 
that central banks had several options in the use of unconventional monetary policy even in situations 
of policy interest rate lower bound. Specifically, certain policies could aim for credit easing (CE) by 
purchasing private sector assets, such as commercial paper and residential asset-backed securities, 
and/or aim for quantitative easing (QE) by large-scale purchases of government securities. Indeed, the 
USA’s Federal Reserve System (Fed) carried out large-scale purchases of mortgage-backed securities 
while the Bank of Japan (BOJ) bought index-linked exchange-traded funds (ETF) and Japanese real 
estate investment trusts (J-REIT). In short, some central banks chose to expand private debts over a 
wider range as a form of monetary policy instrument in order to keep many credit markets functioning.  
 
How do such monetary policies affect financial markets and the real economy? How should we 
appraise and evaluate these central banks’ decisions? Is it feasible to overcome deflation with 
unconventional monetary measures? 
 
The use of unconventional monetary policy is itself not free of controversy. The central banks of 
major advanced countries have carried out CE to shore up depository banks as well as attempted 
different bouts of QE. While QE increases the liability side of the central bank's balance sheet by 
expanding the monetary base, the new phase of CE policy enlarges the asset side by purchasing 
different types of credit in order to get credit markets functioning. These complex ways of 
manipulating the central bank’s balance sheet seem not to have received much attention. Many studies 
of monetary policy only shed light on mechanisms of the determination of interest rates; their analyses 
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preclude any endogenous movement of items within a central bank’s balance sheet. A notable 
exception is the study by Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) which, using the New Keynesian model, 
includes the central bank’s balance sheet in their analysis of the effectiveness of monetary policy. Most 
other Keynesian models, which accept that the long-term interest rate is determined by money supply, 
have not dealt with any aspect of a central bank’s balance sheet. In fact, few studies have shown 
interest in the balance sheets of central banks. 
 
As a rule, however, each identical relations between the balance sheets of central banks and those 
of depository banks should be retained in analysis in order to trace the transmission channels by which 
a purchase of private assets affects the real economy through the financial markets. For this reason, 
this paper attempts to construct a financial model, linked to a macro-econometric model, which reflects 
the central bank’s balance sheet. In the opinion of Shibata and Kosaka, the two linked models provide 
a better guide to explaining how a central bank’s monetary policy generates impacts on the real 
economy via depository banks. Here, by undertaking a comparative assessment of the cases of Japan 
and the USA, our study conducts scenario simulation in the use of two linked models. The study 
thereby offers an alternative solution to current monetary policy that aims to tackle the problem of 
deflation. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the analytical framework of the 
financial market that is used to analyze the effect of unconventional monetary policy that contains 
several factors in the decision-making of central banks and depository banks, including the 
determination of long-term and short-term interest rates, the money supply, and stock prices. Section 
3 presents the data, estimated results, and empirical analysis of our scenario simulation. In particular, 
we use the two linked models to examine improvement of wage rate and their impact on the movement 
of GDP price deflator. Based on the results of the scenario simulation, we discuss whether it is effective 
to continue to rely on current monetary policy in order to tackle problem of deflation. Our concluding 
remarks are given in Section 4. 
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2. Analytical Framework of Financial/Macroeconometric Model  
 
In this section, we will illustrate the theoretical framework of our financial model for analyzing 
unconventional monetary policy. The structure of our model consists of two sectors: the monetary 
sector and the real sector. The economic activities in the financial sector are composed of a central 
bank, depository institutions, and the private sector (i.e., households and industries). The decision 
making of the central bank and depository institutions as well as interest rates will mainly be discussed 
in the basic framework for the financial model in this section, following the basic ideas outlined by 
Klein and Krelle (1983) and Sadahiro (1992). The economic activities of the private sector will be 
explained by the traditional and simple Klein’s skeleton model (1983), which is presented in Appendix 
A.  
 
 
2.1. Optimal Control Monetary Policy by Central Bank 
Under current monetary policy, the central bank sets the policy interest rate close to zero lower 
bound and increases liquidity in the financial system by purchasing government bonds, corporate 
bonds, and asset-backed securities, which encourages commercial banks to provide loans and promote 
the real economy. We assume the objective functions of monetary policymakers based on each credit. 
 
2.1.1. Determining Monetary Instruments  
 
a) Government Treasury Bonds – Unconventional Monetary Policy 
First, we consider the monetary policy instrument of a government securities purchase. It is 
supposed that central banks attempt to affect long-term interest rates by purchasing large scale 
government securities. The statement of policy objectives could be expressed by the social welfare 
function formed by the quadratic loss form (Pissarides, 1972; Friedlaender, 1973; Chow, 1975) as 
follows: 
𝑓𝑛,𝐶𝑇1 = 𝑤11(𝑟𝑛,𝐺𝐵 − 𝑟𝑛,𝐺𝐵
∗ )
2
+ (𝐶𝑇1𝑛,𝐶 − 𝐶𝑇1𝑛,𝐶
∗ )
2
 (3.1)  
where 𝐶𝑇1𝑛,𝐶 denotes the amount of domestic government treasury bonds purchased by the nth 
country’s central bank and 𝑟𝑛,𝐺𝐵 shows that country’s interest rate (long-term interest rate). 𝑟𝑛,𝐺𝐵 is 
a policy target variable and 𝐶𝑇1𝑛,𝐶 is a policy instrument. The asterisk (*) indicates the desired level 
of the policy target variable. In this study, n corresponds to Japan and the United States (𝑛 = 𝑈𝑆, 𝐽𝑃).   
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b) Other Credit Offering – at New Phase of Unconventional Monetary Policy 
Next, consider another monetary policy instrument: buying other private assets. Purchasing asset-
backed securities equities and private sector debts is assumed to affect stock prices and promote private 
consumption and investment. We formulate the policy objectives of central bank as: 
𝑓𝐶𝑇2 = 𝑤21(𝐶𝑃𝐻 − 𝐶𝑃𝐻
∗)2 + 𝑤22(𝐼 − 𝐼
∗)2 + 𝑤23(𝑃𝑆 − 𝑃𝑆
∗)2 + (𝐶𝑇2𝐶 − 𝐶𝑇2𝐶
∗ )2 (3.2)  
where 𝐶𝑃𝐻  and 𝐼  show household consumption and private investment in current prices, 
respectively, and 𝑃𝑆 represents the stock market price index, which refers to policy target variables. 
𝐶𝑇2𝐶 as the policy instrument denotes the amount of asset-backed securities purchased. 
Here, we consider 𝐶𝑇2𝐶 in the context of the United States and Japan. Although the US Federal 
Reserve does not have the ability to directly affect mortgage rates, quantitative easing and credit easing 
indirectly impact on the stock market through the purchase of government securities and mortgage-
backed securities (MBS). Likewise, the Bank of Japan has been increasing its domestic equity holdings 
by purchasing index-linked exchange-traded funds (ETF) and Japanese real estate investment trusts 
(J-REIT), which eventually leads to some impact on the stock markets. The model would be required 
to reflect these realities. 
First, as for United States, purchases of private assets would be represented as: 
𝑓𝑈𝑆,𝐶𝑇2 = 𝑤21(𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑈𝑆 − 𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑈𝑆
∗ )2 + 𝑤22(𝐼𝑈𝑆 − 𝐼𝑈𝑆
∗ )2 + 𝑤23(𝑃𝑆,𝑈𝑆 − 𝑃𝑆,𝑈𝑆
∗ )
2
 
+(𝐶𝑇2𝑈𝑆,𝐶 − 𝐶𝑇2𝑈𝑆,𝐶
∗ )
2
 
(3.3)  
where 𝑃𝑆,𝑈𝑆 corresponds to the Dow Jones Industrial Average and 𝐶𝑇2𝑈𝑆,𝐶  means the amount of 
MBS purchased. 
Next, in the case of Japan, the Bank of Japan continues to purchase ETF and J-REIT, attempting 
to exert a positive impact on stock markets and other asset markets. Therefore, 𝐶𝑇2𝐽𝑃,𝐶  should be 
divided into two parts: 𝐶𝑇2𝐶 for EFT and 𝐶𝑇3𝐶 for J-REIT. Moreover, since there are two types of 
ETF, 𝐶𝑇2𝐶 would be further divided into two more parts: 𝐶𝑇21𝐽𝑃,𝐶 for ETF tracking the Nikkei 225 
Index and 𝐶𝑇22𝐽𝑃,𝐶 tracking Tokyo Stock Price Index.  
Firstly, as for ETF, it is seen that there is the same trend between the accumulation of EFT 
holdings by the Bank of Japan and domestic stock price indices. The Bank of Japan holding ETF 
should theoretically support stock prices, which might lead to increased consumption and boost private 
investment. Taking these factors into consideration, the policymakers’ policy objective with regard to 
𝐶𝑇21𝐽𝑃,𝐶 and 𝐶𝑇22𝐽𝑃,𝐶 will be expressed as follows:  
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𝑓𝐽𝑃,𝐶𝑇2 = 𝑤21(𝐶𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃 − 𝐶𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃
∗ )
2
+ 𝑤22(𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃 − 𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃
∗ )
2
 
+𝑤23(𝑃𝑁𝐾225,𝐽𝑃 − 𝑃𝑁𝐾225,𝐽𝑃
∗ )
2
+ 𝑤24(𝑃𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑋,𝐽𝑃 − 𝑃𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑋,𝐽𝑃
∗ )
2
 
+(𝐶𝑇21𝐽𝑃,𝐶 − 𝐶𝑇21𝐽𝑃,𝐶
∗ )
2
+ (𝐶𝑇22𝐽𝑃,𝐶 − 𝐶𝑇22𝐽𝑃,𝐶
∗ )
2
 
(3.4)  
where 𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃 is private residential investment in current prices, 𝑃𝑁𝐾225,𝐽𝑃 represents the Nikkei 
Stock Price Index, 𝑃𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑋,𝐽𝑃 denotes the Tokyo Stock Price Index. Concerning policy target variables. 
𝐶𝑇21𝐽𝑃,𝐶 and 𝐶𝑇22𝐽𝑃,𝐶 is the amount of buying of ETF tracking the Nikkei 225 Index and the Tokyo 
Stock Price Index, respectively. 
Next, considering J-REIT and the policy target variable 𝐶𝑇3𝐽𝑃,𝐶 , we can also see the same 
relation between the holdings of J-REIT and the Tokyo Stock Exchange REIT Index. Purchases of real 
estate would impact on private residential and non-residential investment. The policy objective of the 
Bank of Japan regarding 𝐶𝑇3𝐽𝑃,𝐶 is described as: 
𝑓𝐽𝑃,𝐶𝑇3 = 𝑤31(𝐼𝑃𝐹𝐽𝑃 − 𝐼𝑃𝐹𝐽𝑃
∗ )
2
+ 𝑤32(𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃 − 𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃
∗ )
2
 
+𝑤33(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇,𝐽𝑃 − 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇,𝐽𝑃
∗ )
2
+ (𝐶𝑇3𝐽𝑃,𝐶 − 𝐶𝑇3𝐽𝑃,𝐶
∗ )
2
 
(3.5)  
where 𝐼𝑃𝐹 denotes non-residential investment in current prices and 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇,𝐽𝑃 represents the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange REIT Index. 
 
 
2.1.2. Deriving Optimal Policy Instruments 
We can derive the optimal policy function, namely the policy reaction function, resulting from 
the central bank’s attempt to minimize the difference between the actual and desired level. Thus, we 
minimize each of the above equations by the corresponding policy instruments 𝐶𝑇1𝐶 , 𝐶𝑇2𝑈𝑆,𝐶 , 
𝐶𝑇21𝐽𝑃,𝐶 , 𝐶𝑇22𝐽𝑃,𝐶  and 𝐶𝑇3𝐽𝑃,𝐶  and rearrange them. The following policy reaction function 
toward (3.1) are obtained as: 
𝐶𝑇1𝑛,𝐶 = 𝐶𝑇1𝑛,𝐶
∗ − 𝑤11(𝑟𝑛,𝐺𝐵 − 𝑟𝑛,𝐺𝐵
∗ )
𝜕𝑟𝑛,𝐺𝐵
𝜕𝐶𝑇1𝑛,𝐶
 (3.6)  
Next, the policy reaction function about purchasing mortgage-backed securities (MBS) by Federal 
Reserve is shown as: 
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𝐶𝑇2𝑈𝑆,𝐶 = 𝐶𝑇21𝑈𝑆,𝐶
∗ − 𝑤21(𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑈𝑆 − 𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑈𝑆
∗ )
𝜕𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑈𝑆
𝜕𝐶𝑇2𝑈𝑆,𝐶
 
−𝑤22(𝐼𝑈𝑆 − 𝐼𝑈𝑆
∗ )
𝜕𝐼𝑈𝑆
𝜕𝐶𝑇2𝑈𝑆,𝐶
− 𝑤23(𝑃𝑠,𝑈𝑆 − 𝑃𝑠,𝑈𝑆
∗ )
𝜕𝑃𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑆
𝜕𝐶𝑇2𝑈𝑆,𝐶
 
(3.7)  
While, the policy reaction functions about purchasing asset-backed securities ETF and J-REIT by the 
Bank of Japan are shown as: 
𝐶𝑇21𝐽𝑃,𝐶 = 𝐶𝑇21𝐽𝑃,𝐶
∗ − 𝑤21(𝐶𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃 − 𝐶𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃
∗ )
𝜕𝐶𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃
𝜕𝐶𝑇21𝐽𝑃,𝐶
− 𝑤22(𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃 − 𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃
∗ )
𝜕𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃
𝜕𝐶𝑇21𝐽𝑃,𝐶
 
−𝑤23(𝑃𝑁𝐾225,𝐽𝑃 − 𝑃𝐼𝑆𝑁𝐼225,𝐽𝑃
∗ )
𝜕𝑃𝐼𝑆𝐽𝑃,𝑁𝐾225
𝜕𝐶𝑇21𝐽𝑃,𝐶
 
(3.8)  
𝐶𝑇22𝐽𝑃,𝐶 = 𝐶𝑇22𝐽𝑃,𝐶
∗ − 𝑤21(𝐶𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃 − 𝐶𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃
∗ )
𝜕𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝜕𝐶𝑇22𝐽𝑃,𝐶
− 𝑤22(𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃 − 𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃
∗ )
𝜕𝐼𝑃𝐻
𝜕𝐶𝑇22𝐽𝑃,𝐶
 
−𝑤24(𝑃𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑋,𝐽𝑃 − 𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑋,𝐽𝑃
∗ )
𝜕𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑋
𝜕𝐶𝑇22𝐽𝑃,𝐶
 
(3.9)  
𝐶𝑇3𝐽𝑃,𝐶 = 𝐶𝑇3𝐽𝑃,𝐶
∗ − 𝑤31(𝐼𝑃𝐹𝐽𝑃 − 𝐼𝑃𝐹𝐽𝑃
∗ )
𝜕𝐼𝑃𝐹𝐽𝑃
𝜕𝐶𝑇3𝐽𝑃,𝐶
− 𝑤32(𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃 − 𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃
∗ )
𝜕𝐼𝑃𝐻𝐽𝑃
𝜕𝐶𝑇3𝐽𝑃,𝐶
 
−𝑤33(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇,𝐽𝑃 − 𝑃𝐼𝑆𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇,𝐽𝑃
∗ )
2 𝜕𝑃𝐼𝑆𝐽𝑃,𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇
𝜕𝐶𝑇3𝐽𝑃,𝐶
 
(3.10)  
These policy reaction function is estimated by the optimal-control technique. When attempting to 
decide current period policy, central banks are assumed to respond to movement some important 
economic variables over time. The optimal control method can reflect them. 
 
 
2.2. Optimal Behavior of Private Depository institutions 
In this subsection, we consider the decision making of depository institutions, namely, optimal 
loans of depository institutions from the central bank and their optimal lending to the private sector. 
 
2.2.1. Determining Optimal Loans from the Central Bank 
First, we consider the determination of optimal loans from the central bank. In short, the revenue 
of commercial banks is obtained via the difference between interest that they pay on customer deposits 
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and the interest they receive on loans. When depository institutions are assumed to receive loans from 
central banks at discount rates, financing received from central banks is utilized for short-term liquidity 
needs for borrowing for financial institutions. When reflecting these realities, the problem of 
commercial banks can be formalized by short-term profit maximization as:  
𝜋𝐿𝐶 = −
1
2
𝑤𝐶1(𝐿𝐶 − 𝐿𝐶
∗ )2 −
1
2
𝑤𝐶2(𝐿𝐵 − 𝛼𝐶𝐿𝐶)
2 
+
1
𝑟𝑆
∗ (𝑟𝑆𝐿𝐶 − 𝑟𝐷𝐿𝐶) +
1
𝑟𝑆
∗ 𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵 −
1
𝑟𝑆
∗ 𝑟𝐷𝑇(𝐷𝑃0 + 𝛽𝐶𝐿𝐵) 
(3.11)  
where 𝐿𝐶 denotes borrowings of depository banks from the central bank, 𝐿𝐶
∗  indicates the targeted 
level of 𝐿𝐶 , 𝐿𝐵 shows loans from depository banks to consumers and business, and 𝐷𝑃0 is the 
primary deposit. 𝑟𝑆 is the short-term interest rate, 𝑟𝐷 is the discount rate, 𝑟𝐷𝑇 is the depository rate, 
and 𝑟𝐿 is the lending rate.  
The quadratic loss function in the upper line of equation (3.11) represents a proportional relation 
between the borrowing of commercial banks from a central bank and the lending of commercial banks 
to the private sector. It is supposed that the more money supplied to commercial banks by the central 
bank, the more banks are encouraged to lend to the private sector (and vice versa). 
The terms in the lower line of equation (3.11) describe the profit of commercial banks. 𝑟𝐷𝐿𝐶 
implies financing received from central banks and 𝑟𝑆𝐿𝐶 intends that money provided by central banks 
is invested in short-term liquidity needs by financial institutions. Thus, revenue is represented by 𝑟𝑆𝐿𝐶 
and 𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵, whilst the cost is shown by 𝑟𝐷𝐿𝐶, 𝑟𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑃0, and 𝑟𝐷𝑇𝐿𝐵.  
We consider the first order conditions for this problem with respect to 𝐿𝐶. In this process, the 
term of partial derivatives 𝜕𝐿𝐵 𝜕𝐿𝐶⁄  is assumed to represent conjectural variations placed by 𝜆𝐶. We 
can yield the following equation. 
𝐿𝐶 =
𝑤𝐶1𝐿𝐶
∗ − 𝑤𝐶2(𝛼𝐶 − 𝜆𝐶)𝐿𝐵 +
1
𝑟𝑆
∗ (𝑟𝑆 − 𝑟𝐷) +
𝜆𝐶
𝑟𝑆
∗ 𝑟𝐿 −
𝛽𝐶𝜆𝐶
𝑟𝑆
∗ 𝑟𝐷𝑇
𝑤𝐶1 − 𝛼𝐶𝑤𝐶2(𝛼𝐶 − 𝜆𝐶)
 
(3.12)  
Here, by replacing 𝑟𝑆
∗ = 𝑟𝑆 and 𝐻𝐶 = 𝑤𝐶1 − 𝛼𝐶𝑤𝐶2(𝛼𝐶 − 𝜆𝐶), the optimal borrowing of depository 
banks from central bank is shown as follows: 
𝐿𝐶 =
𝑤𝐶1
𝐻𝐶
𝐿𝐶
∗ −
𝑤𝐶2(𝛼𝐶 − 𝜆𝐶)
𝐻𝐶
𝐿𝐵 +
1
𝐻𝐶
(𝑟𝑆 − 𝑟𝐷)
𝑟𝑆
+
𝜆𝐶
𝐻𝐶
𝑟𝐿
𝑟𝑆
−
𝛽𝐶𝜆𝐶
𝐻𝐶
𝑟𝐷𝑇
𝑟𝑆
 (3.13)  
The first term should show positive. A sign in the second term depends on a sign of (𝛼𝐶 − 𝜆𝐶).  
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2.2.2. Determining Optimal Lending to Private Sectors 
This section describes the optimal lending of depository banks (commercial banks) to the private 
sector, which implies a theory of money creation—the so-called “money multiplier”—that money is 
created via banks making loans. The central bank is assumed to affect the quantity of money in 
circulation. The increase of money supply is assumed to trigger the creation of reserves and growth in 
the broader monetary aggregate. 
It is assumed that depository banks attempt to make profits by lending money to customers. 
Meanwhile, depository banks are forced to follow tight regulations for risk management, which means 
that bank lending is constrained. Hence, it is assumed that the depository banks attempt to determine 
the optimal lending to maximize profit over the long-term as: 
𝜋𝐿𝐵 = −
1
2
𝑤𝐵1(𝐿𝐵 − 𝛼𝐵𝐼𝐹)
2 −
1
2
𝑤𝐵2{𝐿𝐵 − 𝛾𝐵(𝐿𝐶 + 𝐶𝑇𝐶)}
2 
−
1
2
𝑤𝐵3(𝐿𝐵 − 𝜙𝐵𝐴𝑇𝐵)
2 +
1
𝑟𝐿
∗ 𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐵 −
1
𝑟𝐿
∗ 𝑟𝐷𝑇(𝐷𝑃0 + 𝛽𝐵𝐿𝐵) 
(3.14)  
where 𝐿𝐵 denotes loans from commercial banks to consumers and business. 𝐴𝑇𝐵 is total assets of 
commercial banks, which implies capital adequacy ratio 8 %, namely Basel regulation. With an 
assumption of 𝜕 𝑟𝐿
∗ 𝜕𝐿𝐵⁄ = 0, the optimal condition is as: 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐵
𝜕𝐿𝐵
= −𝑤𝐵1(𝐿𝐵 − 𝛼𝐵𝐼𝐹)(1 − 𝛼𝐵𝜆𝐵) − 𝑤𝐵2{𝐿𝐵 − 𝛾𝐵(𝐿𝐶 + 𝐶𝑇𝐶)} 
−𝑤𝐵3(𝐿𝐵 − 𝜙𝐵𝐴𝑇𝐵) + 1 −
𝛽𝐵
𝑟𝐿
𝑟𝐷𝑇 = 0 
(3.15)  
Here, we rewrite this equation for 𝑟𝐿
∗ = 𝑟𝐿. The term of partial derivatives 𝜕𝐼𝐹 𝜕𝐿𝐵⁄  is regarded as 
conjectural variations, and placed by 𝜆𝐵. The optimal lending is derived as: 
𝐿𝐵 =
𝑤𝐵1𝛼𝐵(1 − 𝛼𝐵𝜆𝐵)
𝐻𝐵
𝐼𝐹 +
𝑤𝐵2𝛾𝐵
𝐻𝐵
(𝐿𝐶 + 𝐶𝑇𝐶) +
𝑤𝐵3𝜙𝐵
𝐻𝐵
𝐴𝑇𝐵 +
1
𝐻𝐵
−
𝑟𝐷𝑇
𝑟𝐿
𝛽𝐵
𝐻𝐵
 
𝐻𝐵 = (1 − 𝛼𝐵𝜆𝐵)𝑤𝐵1 + 𝑤𝐵2 + 𝑤𝐵3 
(3.16)  
The second term (𝐿𝐶 + 𝐶𝑇𝐶) represents quantitative easing and credit easing by purchasing treasury 
securities and other private assets. The unconventional monetary policy aims to drive lending by 
depository banks to public through (𝐿𝐶 + 𝐶𝑇𝐶). It is thought that central banks attempt to impact the 
real economy through via financial institutions using this transmission channel. 
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2.3. Identical Relation of Money Supply 
According to Klein and Krelle (1983), money supply is directly defined by credit creation multiplier 
as follows:  
𝑀𝑆 = 𝑚𝑅𝑀 (3.17)  
where 𝑀𝑆 is money supply, 𝑅𝑀 is reserve money and 𝑚 is credit multiplier. However, in order to 
grasp more detailed process of money creation, we modify this original model as: 
𝑀𝑆 = 𝑓𝑚𝑠(𝑅𝑀, 𝐿𝐵) (3.18)  
The interest rate of lending loans related to 𝐿𝐵 is attempted to be endogenized in the next sub-section.  
 
 
2.4. Determination of Interest Rates 
 
i. Short-Term Interest Rate 
The policy interest rate is the most important interest rate in the economy, as it is the basis for all 
other short-term interest rates. The policy interest rate is charged in interbank transactions. Depository 
banks charge their customers the prime rate based on the policy interest rate. Therefore, the policy 
interest rate affects other interests including other short-term interest rates, lending rates, and deposit 
rates. Thus, the short-term interest is assumed to be explained by the policy interest rate and the interest 
rate of reserve deposit requirement as: 
𝑟𝑠 = 𝑓𝑟𝑠(𝑟𝑚, 𝑟𝐷𝐶) (3.19)  
where 𝑟𝑚 denotes the monetary policy interest rate and 𝑟𝐷𝐶 is the interest rate of reserve deposit 
requirement. The policy interest rate corresponds to the overnight call rate in Japan and the Federal 
Fund Rate (FFR) in United States.  
 
ii. Discount Rate 
The discount rate is one of the policy tools of central bank. Since the movement of discount rate 
is supposed to be closely related to policy interest rate, we set as:  
𝑟𝐷 = 𝑓𝑟𝐷(𝑟𝑚) (3.20)  
𝑟𝐷 represents the discount rate.  
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iii. Lending Rate 
It is assumed that the interest rate of lending from commercial banks to public has basically be in 
a same response to the short-term interest rate. We set the following equation. 
𝑟𝐿 = 𝑓𝑟𝐿(𝑟𝑚) (3.21)  
 
iv. Long-Term Interest Rate 
The long-term interest rate is thought to be based on the point of equilibrium in the money market. 
Assuming 𝑀𝑆 = 𝑀𝐷, the equilibrium of the money market is represented as: 
𝑀𝑆
𝑝
= 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑟𝐺𝐵 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑅 (3.22)  
where 𝑋 is real total output. This is the real money demand function. In short, holding money is an 
alternative to holding bonds. The decision for an individual’s portfolio would be divided into money 
and bonds. Namely, the motivation for the determination of portfolio choice depends on interest rates. 
We introduce the investor’s portfolio choice theory following Markowitz1 . Thus, the real demand 
function can be redefined as: 
𝑀𝑆
𝑝
= 𝑀𝐷 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑅) + 𝛽0(1 − 𝛾1𝑟1 − 𝛾2𝑟2 ⋯ − 𝛾𝑛𝑟𝑛) 
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋 + (𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑟1 − 𝛽2𝑟2 ⋯ − 𝛽𝑛𝑟𝑛) 
(3.23)  
Rearranging (3.23) for 𝑟𝐺𝐵, we obtain as: 
𝑟𝐺𝐵 = 𝛽0 − 𝛽1
𝑀𝑆
𝑝
+ 𝛽2𝑋𝑅 (3.24)  
Additionally, the long-term interest rate is in a practical arbitrage relation with the short-term market 
and to the international bond market, and in a correlation to the domestic stock market. Taking this 
into consideration, the long-term interest rate can be extended as follows:  
𝑟𝐺𝐵 = 𝛽0 − 𝛽1
𝑀𝑆
𝑝
+ 𝛽2𝑋𝑅 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑆 + 𝛽4𝑟𝐺𝐵
𝑈𝑆 − 𝛽5𝑝𝑒𝑟 (3.25)  
where 𝑟𝐺𝐵
𝑈𝑆 denotes the interest rate of treasury securities and 𝑝𝑒𝑟 represents price to earnings ratio 
in the domestic stock market.  
                                                     
1 The basic idea of the modification about this model is explained by Kosaka (2016). 
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2.5. Description of the Stock Market 
As historical experience of the bubble economy in Japan suggests, the financial market is 
interrelated with the stock market. Therefore, we make the transmission channel between stock market 
and financial market as: 
𝑃𝑠 = 𝑓𝑃𝑆(𝑟𝐺𝐵 − 𝑃𝐸𝑅, 𝑃𝑠,−1) (3.26)  
where 𝑃𝑠 denotes the representative price index in the stock market. This variable corresponds to the 
Nikkei Stock Average in Japan and to the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the United States.  
Additionally, the stock price variation is assumed to affect consumption and investment. Taking 
this into consideration, we endogenize the price to earnings ratio (P/E ratio) that reflects the 
performance of the stock market.  
𝑃𝐸𝑅 = 𝑓𝑃𝐸𝑅(𝑋𝑅, 𝑃𝐸𝑅−1) (3.27)  
The P/E ratio is historically explained by real total output 𝑋𝑅 and 𝑃𝐸𝑅. As mentioned above, 𝑋𝑅 
is determined macro economy block (See Appendix. A)  
Following this analytical framework, we construct empirical financial/macroeconometric models 
for Japan and the USA, respectively—the simultaneous equation model. Using this model enables us 
to conduct scenario simulations. Meanwhile, regarding the analysis for optimal control of monetary 
policy, the optimal monetary policy instruments could be solved under constraints on the whole model 
of the financial-macro linked model, employing a technique of optimal control.  
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3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1. Data 
We employ several data sources to investigate to construct the empirical model for analysis of 
current monetary policy about the case of Japan and the United States.  
For constructing a Japanese macro econometric model, we mainly use the quarterly National 
Accounts Statistics of each countries. The Source of U.S. economic statistics is published by the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), agency of Department of Commerce. The Japanese National 
Economic Accounting is from Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. We can get these data from first 
quarter of 1980 to the third quarter 2016.  
Also, as for building to model for a monetary sector, we utilize the data from central banks: the 
Bank of Japan and the Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System. We use the data like balance 
sheet of central bank, some kinds of interest rates (lending a loan, depository, and short-term etc.) and 
stock market data. The data source of long-term interest rate, 10-year government bond rate in Japan, 
is from the Ministry of Finance, Japan. And, 10-year treasury long-term rate data in the United States 
is from the U.S. Department of The Treasury.  
 
 
3.2. Estimated Results and Final Test 
 
3.2.1. Estimated Results 
We estimate the stochastic equations of the model for the monetary sector and the macroeconomic 
sector of Japan and the United States respectively. The sample period of this model is from the first 
quarter 2008 to the third quarter 2016, that is, the time period for the implementation of the 
unconventional monetary policy since the global financial crisis in 2008. We applied ordinary least 
squares. Here, we would show the several estimation results about crucial variables. The summary is 
as follows2.  
 
(i) Optimal Bank Loans from the Central Bank 
Table 1 represents the estimated results of optimal loans of depository banks from the central 
bank in Japan3 . This model employs approximations. From the estimated results, we see that the 
relation among interest rates affects the lending from central banks. We conclude that the calculations 
are acceptable.  
                                                     
2 The estimation result of macroeconomic sector would be represented in Appendix A.  
3 In case of the United States, the loans from Federal Reserve Bank to the depository institutions is quite 
limited. Therefore, we don’t apply this model for the United Sates.   
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Table 1. Optimal Loans of Depository Banks from Central Bank in Japan: Sample 2000q2-2017q1 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient S.E. 
Loans to Depository Banks 0.061 0.061406 
(Short-Term Interest Rate (-2)-Discount Rate (-2))/Short-Term Interest Rate (-1) -127.017 -127.0166 
Deposit Rate(-2) / Short-Term Interest Rate (-1) -1830.134 -1830.134 
Dummy from 2000q1 to 2017q4 -199947.5*** -199947.5 
AR (1) 0.911*** 0.911391 
Constant 1847.530*** 466136.7 
Observation  66 
Adj. R-squared  0.964 
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. “S.E.” indicates robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
(ii) Optimal Loans to Banks Private Sectors 
Table 2 and Table 3 represent the estimated results of optimal loans of depository banks to the 
private sector (i.e., consumers and industries) in Japan and the United States, respectively. Statistics 
show that prices are well estimated. Both tables clearly show that money provision by central banks 
affects depository banks’ lending to customers. This effect is most obvious in the case of the United 
States. At the same time, we can see a relation between lending to customers and investment, that is, 
a relation between monetary markets and the real economy. It is supposed that there is an impact of 
unconventional monetary policy on the real economy. We conclude that these results are largely 
acceptable. 
 
Table 2. Optimal Lending of Depository Banks to Private Sectors in Japan: Sample 2003q1-2017q1 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient S.E. 
ln (Investment in Constant Price in (-4)) 0.088461 0.078 
ln (Money Provision by Central Bank(-2)) 0.051210* 0.023 
Short-Term Interest Rate/Lending Interest Rate (-1) -0.028976 0.035 
Dummy from 2008q4 to 2009q1 0.017072*** 0.004 
AR(1) 0.978545*** 0.027 
Constant 13.56766*** 0.814 
Observation  57 
Adj. R-squared  0.978 
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. “S.E.” indicates robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Optimal Lending of Depository Banks to Private sectors in the U.S.: Sample 2003q1-2017q1 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient S.E. 
ln (Investment in Constant Price in (-4)) 5418655.*** 302217.6 
ln (Money Provision by Central Bank) 1330740.*** 891845.2 
Short-Term Interest Rate/Lending Interest Rate (-1) -527643.4*** 184592.8 
Dummy from 2008q3 to 2009q3 930536.0 667525.5 
Constant -54473142*** 891845.2 
Observation  59 
Adj. R-squared  0.874 
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. “S.E.” indicates robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
(iii) Long-Term Interest Rate 
Central banks purchase government securities and other securities from markets by quantitative 
easing (QE) in unconventional monetary policy in order to increase money provision and lower 
interest rates. Also, quantitative easing (QE) in unconventional monetary policy is conducted to 
promote lending and liquidity through the increase in central bank reserves on commercial banks’ 
balance sheets. The aim of these policies is to boost stock market performance and reduce long and 
medium term interest rates on government securities and mortgage bonds. Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate 
that the money provision by the central bank, the P/E ratio in the stock market, and short-term interest 
rate affect the long-term interest rate.   
 
 
Table 4. 10-Year Government Bond Rate in Japan: Sample 2000q2-2017q1 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient S.E. 
M2 /GDP Deflator4 -0.367*** 0.111 
Short-Term Interest Rate 0.564    0.431 
Price Earnings Ratio 0.402*** 0.211 
AR (1) 0.854*** 0.058 
Constant 3.710***  0.817 
Observation  68 
Adj. R-squared  0.92 
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. “S.E.” indicates robust standard errors. ***, **, 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
                                                     
4 GDP deflator in Japan is evaluated in 2011 Price. 
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Table 5. 10-Year Treasury Yield Rate in the U.S.: Sample 2003q1-2017q3 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient S.E. 
M2 /GDP Deflator5 -0.049*** 0.006 
Short-Term Interest Rate (-2) 0.143** 0.059 
Price Earnings Ratio of SP500 0.073*** 0.021 
MA(1) 0.728*** 0.120 
Constant 5.527***  0.589  
Observation  59 
Adj. R-squared  0.93 
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. “S.E.” indicates robust standard errors. ***, **, 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
3.2.2. Final Tests 
In total, the model for Japan consists of 33 simultaneous equations, comprising 24 estimated 
equations and 9 definitional identities, whilst the model for the United States consists of 35 
simultaneous equations, comprising 23 estimated equations and 12 definitional identities. We 
conducted the final test from the first quarter 2009 to the third quarter 2016 (Quarterly). Table 6 and 
Table 7 show the root mean square percentage error (RMSPE)6 about selected variables of Japan and 
the United States respectively. Some endogenous variables might not be satisfactory. However, the 
overall performance of this system is acceptable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 GDP deflator in the USA is evaluated in 2009 Price 
6 RMSPE shows the evaluation of model fitness. RMSPE = √
1
𝑇
∑ {(?̂?𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡)/𝑋𝑡}
2𝑇
𝑡=1  where 𝑋𝑡 is 
the actual observation time series, ?̂?𝑡 denotes the estimated time series, and 𝑇 represents the 
number of time series data. 
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Table 6. Evaluation of Model Performance of Japan by RMSPE  
Variables RMSPE 
Employment  0.002  
Price Index of Gross Domestic Product (Chain-type index 2011=100) 0.005  
Lending from Depository Banks to Public Sectors 0.006  
Wage Rate 0.006  
Consumption of Fixed Capital 0.008  
Gross Domestic Product (Chain-type index 2011=100) 0.009  
Private Consumption (Chain-type index 2011=100) 0.013  
Disposable Income  0.013  
Investment (Chain-type index 2011=100) 0.018  
Import (Chain-type index 2011=100) 0.024  
Corporate Tax 0.031  
Income Tax 0.033  
Direct Tax 0.035  
Export (Chain-type index 2011=100) 0.039  
Net Operating Surplus 0.050  
Money Supply (M2) 0.052  
Lending Rate 0.055  
Discount Rate 0.057  
Tokyo Stock Price Index 0.073  
Loans from Central Bank to Depository Banks 0.098  
Price Earnings Ratio 0.168  
Interest Rate of Government Bond (10 Year) 0.556  
Short Term Interest Rate  3.833 
 
Table 7. Evaluation of Model Performance of the U.S. by RMSPE 
Variables RMSPE 
Employment  0.006  
Wage Rate 0.006  
Direct Tax 0.008  
Export (Chain-type index 2009=100) 0.012  
Price Index of Gross Domestic Product (Chain-type index 2009=100) 0.012  
Gross Domestic Product (Chain-type index 2009=100) 0.013  
Import (Chain-type index 2009=100) 0.014  
Capital Stock 0.016  
Disposable Income 0.017  
Private Consumption (Chain-type index 2009=100) 0.020  
Lending Rate 0.037  
Investment (Chain-type index 2009=100) 0.040  
Price Earnings Ratio (SP500) 0.040  
Money Supply (M2) 0.042  
Net Operating Surplus 0.043  
Consumption of Fixed Capital (Chain-type index 2009=100) 0.046  
Income Tax 0.048  
Corporate Tax 0.051  
Discount Rate 0.058  
Stock Price Index of NASDAQ 0.058  
Lending from Depository Banks to Public Sectors 0.063  
Treasury Rate (10 Year) 0.193  
IPH09_USA(Chain-type index 2009=100) 0.223  
Short Term Interest Rate 0.416  
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3.3. Scenario Simulation 
 
3.3.1. Baseline Simulation 
We assume that this system in the post-sample period is from the fourth quarter 2016 to fourth 
quarter of 2050 (quarterly). In order to estimate the whole model in the post sample period, we are 
required to make the data for the exogenous variables in the post-sample in advance. Some variables 
are created along with their trends, whereas the others are set at a constant value at the end of sample 
the fourth quarter 2016. Especially, the policy interest rate is put in the third quarter of 2017 in order 
to avoid a discussion about exit strategy of monetary policy.  
 
3.3.2. Scenario: Proposing A Possible Alternative Policy to the Current Monetary Stance 
The central bank has relied heavily on unconventional monetary policy to tackle the deflation 
problem. Certainly, its unconventional monetary policy, including quantitative easing (QE) and credit 
easing (CE), might have expanded their capacity to influence monetary markets and financial 
conditions and the economy, compared to conventional monetary policy based on instrument of policy 
interest rate. However, they have not yet achieved the goal of overcoming deflation. For this reason, 
it is doubtful that current monetary policy has the power to overcome the deflation problem. 
Deflation is thought to reflect weaknesses in the real economy. Thus, it would be required to 
examine an alternative solution using approaches based on the real economy. To do so, we conduct a 
scenario simulation to examine whether an improvement of wage rate would have an impact on prices. 
This simulation attempts to show an alternative solution to current monetary policy. Specifically, if 
wage rate is improved by 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent, and 1 percent toward baseline values, respectively, 
from the fourth quarter of 2016 to the fourth quarter of 2022, we examine how the GDP deflator would 
change.  
 
3.3.3. Simulated Results 
Table 8 shows the results for Japan. We can see slight differences in the movement of the GDP 
deflator among cases with wage rate increasing by 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent, and 1 percent. Wage rate 
increases show almost no effect versus baseline values until the third quarter of 2017, but the 
differences become remarkable after the third quarter of 2019. The results for the United States are 
different from Japan; the change is relatively large. Thus, these results show that there might be a 
possibility that the rise of wage rate would become an alternative solution to current monetary policy 
that aims to tackle the problem of deflation, especially in Japan.  
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Table 8. Movement of GDP Deflator by Percent Change of Wage Rate of Japan 
Time Baseline 0.1% 0.5% 1% 
2017Q1 102.18  102.18  102.18  102.18  
2017Q2 101.97  101.97  101.97  101.97  
2017Q3 102.10  102.10  102.13  102.17  
2017Q4 101.89  101.90  101.93  101.96  
2018Q1 102.05  102.06  102.12  102.19  
2018Q2 101.85  101.86  101.92  101.99  
2018Q3 101.98  102.00  102.08  102.19  
2018Q4 101.81  101.83  101.91  102.01  
2019Q1 101.93  101.95  102.06  102.19  
2019Q2 101.77  101.79  101.90  102.03  
2019Q3 101.88  101.91  102.04  102.20  
2019Q4 101.74  101.77  101.90  102.05  
2020Q1 101.84  101.87  102.02  102.21  
2020Q2 101.71  101.75  101.89  102.08  
2020Q3 101.80  101.84  102.01  102.22  
2020Q4 101.68  101.72  101.89  102.10  
2021Q1 101.76  101.81  101.99  102.23  
2021Q2 101.65  101.70  101.89  102.12  
2021Q3 101.72  101.77  101.98  102.24  
2021Q4 101.62  101.67  101.88  102.14  
2022Q1 101.68  101.74  101.96  102.24  
2022Q2 101.59  101.65  101.87  102.15  
2022Q3 101.65  101.71  101.95  102.24  
2022Q4 101.56  101.62  101.86  102.16  
 
Table 9. Movement of GDP Deflator by Percent Change of Wage Rate of the U.S. 
Time Baseline 0.1% 0.5% 1% 
2017Q1 109.03  109.14  109.58  110.13  
2017Q2 111.16  111.28  111.73  112.29  
2017Q3 110.06  110.17  110.61  111.17  
2017Q4 109.76  109.88  110.36  110.97  
2018Q1 108.61  108.73  109.21  109.80  
2018Q2 108.62  108.74  109.21  109.81  
2018Q3 110.01  110.13  110.61  111.21  
2018Q4 109.09  109.22  109.74  110.39  
2019Q1 109.13  109.26  109.78  110.42  
2019Q2 108.52  108.64  109.15  109.79  
2019Q3 109.69  109.81  110.32  110.96  
2019Q4 108.80  108.94  109.48  110.17  
2020Q1 109.23  109.37  109.91  110.59  
2020Q2 108.52  108.65  109.18  109.85  
2020Q3 109.44  109.57  110.09  110.75  
2020Q4 108.95  109.09  109.65  110.35  
2021Q1 109.41  109.55  110.11  110.81  
2021Q2 108.88  109.01  109.56  110.24  
2021Q3 109.50  109.64  110.18  110.85  
2021Q4 109.45  109.59  110.17  110.88  
2022Q1 109.85  109.99  110.55  111.26  
2022Q2 109.58  109.72  110.28  110.97  
2022Q3 109.95  110.08  110.63  111.32  
2022Q4 110.23  110.37  110.95  111.68  
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4. Conclusion 
 
This paper constructed a financial model, linked to a macroeconometric model, that reflects the 
central bank’s balance sheet to address how the monetary policy employed by central banks impacts 
the real economy through other depository banks. We then used the two linked models to examine 
improvement of wage rate and the impact on the movement of GDP price deflator. According to the 
results, when wage rates rise, it eventually leads to positive impact on GDP deflator through some 
markets. Hence, there might be a possibility that the rise of wage rate could become an alternative 
solution to current monetary policy, which aims to tackle the problem of deflation. We might be 
required to reconsider the current stance in that the economy is relying too heavily on current monetary 
policy based on QE and CE for overcoming the problem of deflation.  
On the other hand, in the future, we should extend this model to improve its applicability to policy 
analysis. First, this study did not cover the implementation of optimal control, but we would be 
required to conduct simulations employing the optimal control of monetary policy, which could 
provide further insights about how best to conduct monetary policy. Second, optimal control of 
monetary policy should be simulated by linking Japan and the US. While scenario simulations were 
conducted for Japan and the US individually, we have not extended to simulating economic impacts 
by interrelation between two countries. Third, we should construct a model based on the balance sheet 
for government and link this to the financial model/macroeconometric model because it is 
indispensable to see the relation among monetary policy, fiscal policy, and real economy for better 
discussion about more appropriate remedies for deflation and the economy. Finally, the 
macroeconometric model should be modified into a more applicable framework for analyzing real 
economy sufficiently. Certainly, the performance and usability of the macroeconometric model based 
on Klein might be better than other types of macro models. However, it is so simple and intuitive that 
it could not determine the detailed causes of related issues. Indeed, to address the core of mechanisms 
of deflation, we would be required to have profound insights into not only wage rate but also labor 
productivity related to wage rate. To do so, the macroeconomic sector would be needed to be replaced 
by a multi-country/multi-sector econometric model which has a mechanism of microeconomic 
foundation. 
This approach is in its infancy. By improving this model to a more comprehensive system, this 
model can become a more powerful tool for applying evaluations of monetary or other problems. 
These improvements will be implemented in future studies. 
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Appendix A. Framework of Macroeconometric Model  
 
This section illustrates the macroeconometric model. We follow Klein’s skeleton model (1983). We 
partially extend this conventional model for making the transmission channel of monetary policy to 
macro economy7.  
 
Endogenous Variables 
𝑋𝑅𝑡 : Gross domestic product (real) 𝐿𝑡 : Employment 
𝐶𝑅𝑡 : Private final consumption (real) 𝐿𝐹𝑡 : Labor force 
𝐼𝑅𝑡 : Gross fixed capital formation (real) 𝑤𝑡  : Wage rate 
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 : Exports (real) 𝑟𝑡 : Interest rate (real) 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑡 : Imports (real) 𝑇1,𝑡 : Indirect tax (nominal) 
𝐾𝑅𝑡 : Capital stock (real) 𝑇2,𝑡 : Direct tax (nominal) 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 : Depreciation (real) 𝑇3,𝑡 : Corporation profit tax (nominal) 
𝑌𝑡 : National income (nominal) 𝑇𝑟,𝑡 : Transfer payments (nominal) 
𝜋𝑡 : Corporation profit (nominal) 𝑒𝑡 : Exchange rate 
𝑝𝑡  : GDP deflator   
 
Exogenous Variables  
𝐺𝑅𝑡 : Government final consumption (real)  𝑁𝑡 : Population 
𝑊𝑇𝑡  : World trade transactions (real) 𝑝𝑤,𝑡 : World trade price 
𝑀𝑡 : Money supply (nominal) 𝑝𝑚,𝑡 : Import price 
 
Identities  
Real GDP 
𝑋𝑅𝑡 = 𝐶𝑅𝑡 + 𝐺𝑅𝑡 + 𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 − 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑡 (A.1)  
Nominal GDP 
𝑝𝑡𝑋𝑅𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 + (𝑇1,𝑡 + 𝑇2,𝑡 + 𝑇3,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑟,𝑡) − 𝑝𝑡𝐷𝑅𝑡 (A.2)  
National income  
𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 + (𝑇2,𝑡 + 𝑇3,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑟,𝑡) (A.3)  
                                                     
7 Since this is a conventional model, we do not provide a detailed explanation (See Klein (1983)). 
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Capital stock 
𝐾𝑅𝑡 = 𝐾𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑅𝑡 − 𝐷𝑅𝑡 (A.4)  
 
Behavior and Technological Relations 
Consumption 
𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝑁𝑡
= 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 (
𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡𝑝𝑡
) + 𝑎2 (
𝐶𝑅𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
) + 𝑢1,𝑡 (A.5)  
Investment 
𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑟𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝑢2,𝑡 (A.6)  
Export 
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑊𝑇𝑡 + 𝑐2 (
𝑝𝑤,𝑡
𝑝𝑡
) + 𝑐3𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑢3,𝑡 (A.7)  
Import 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑡 = 𝑑0 + 𝑑1𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝑑2 (
𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑚,𝑡
) + 𝑑3𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑢4,𝑡 (A.8)  
Employment 
log 𝐿𝑡 = 𝑓0 + 𝑓1 log 𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝑓2 log 𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝑓3𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝑢5,𝑡 (A.9)  
Price formation 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑔0 + 𝑔1 (
𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡
𝑋𝑅𝑡
) + 𝑔2𝑝𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑢6,𝑡 (A.10)  
Wage fate 
𝑤𝑡 = ℎ0 + ℎ1 (
𝑋𝑅𝑡
𝐿𝑡
) + ℎ2𝑝𝑡 + 𝑢7,𝑡 (A.11)  
Labor force 
𝐿𝐹𝑡
𝑁𝑡
= 𝑖0 + 𝑖1 (
𝐿𝐹𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡
𝐿𝐹𝑡
) + 𝑖2 (
𝑤𝑡
𝑝𝑡
) + 𝑢8,𝑡 (A.12)  
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Velocity of circulation of money 
log (
𝑝𝑡𝑋𝑅𝑡
𝑀𝑡
) = 𝑗0 + 𝑗1𝑟𝑡 + 𝑗2Δ log 𝑝𝑡 + 𝑢9,𝑡 
𝑗1 < 0, 𝑗2 > 0 
(A.13)  
Depreciation 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 = 𝑘0 + 𝑘1𝐾𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑢10,𝑡 (A.14)  
Indirect tax 
𝑇1,𝑡 = 𝑙0 + 𝑙1(𝑝𝑡𝑋𝑅𝑡) + 𝑢11,𝑡 (A.15)  
Indirect tax 
𝑇2,𝑡 = 𝑚0 + 𝑚1𝑌𝑡 + 𝑢12,𝑡 (A.16)  
Corporation tax 
𝑇3,𝑡 = 𝑛0 + 𝑛1𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢13,𝑡 (A.17)  
Transfer payments  
𝑇𝑟,𝑡 = 𝑜0 + 𝑜1(𝐿𝐹𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡) + 𝑜2𝑤𝑡 + 𝑢14,𝑡 (A.18)  
Exchange Rate  
log 𝑒𝑡 = 𝑞0 + 𝑞1 log (
𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡
𝑈𝑆𝐴) + 𝑞2(𝑟𝑡
𝑈𝑆𝐴 − 𝑟𝑡) − 𝑞3 (
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 − 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑡
𝑝𝑡𝑋𝑅𝑡
) + 𝑢15,𝑡 
𝑞1 > 0, 𝑞2 > 0, 𝑞3 > 0 
(A.19)  
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Appendix C. Estimated Results 
 
This section will show the estimated results. All equations are basically by ordinary leas squares. 
The t-statistic is shows in parentheses, and the p-values is represented in brackets. 
 
B.1 Japan  
Macroeconomic Sector 
(B.1) Consumption (Real)  
CP11_JPN/POP_JPN=35.6820373138  
(6.238) 
[0.000] 
+6.94917525766*LOG(YD_JPN/(POP_JPN*PGDP11_JPN)) 
(3.690) 
[0.001] 
+0.226319255741*CP11_JPN(-4)/POP_JPN(-4)  
(1.881) 
[0.065] 
+[AR(1)=0.892588205564,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2000Q1 2016Q4"] 
(13.629) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.945 S.E.=0.203 D.W.=2.394 
 
(B.2) Investment (Real) 
LOG(I11_JPN)=4.42092823551 
(1.607) 
[0.113] 
+0.53668968935*LOG(GDP11_JPN(-2)) -0.000832360776107*R_GB_JPN(-4) 
(2.559)                            (-0.048) 
[0.013]                            [0.962] 
+[AR(1)=0.955588712446,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2001Q1 2017Q3"] 
(23.517) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.928 S.E.=0.020 D.W.=1.368 
 
(B.3) Export (Real) 
LOG(EX11_JPN)=11.1924995048+0.724799515437*DLOG(WT_SA(-1)) 
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(86.079)      (11.856) 
[0.000]       [0.000] 
+0.589450548819*LOG(PWT10_SA(-2)/PGDP11_JPN(-2)) 
(4.786) 
[0.000] 
-0.147132137808*DM08Q4_09Q1 
(-2.368) 
[0.021] 
+[AR(1)=0.970955815439,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2000Q1 2017Q1"] 
(17.769) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.969 S.E.=0.039 D.W.=2.117 
 
(B.4) Import (Real) 
IM11_JPN=-1344096.87692 
(-6.707) 
[0.000] 
+104625.513862*LOG(GDP11_JPN) +0.635523348833*IM11_JPN(-1) 
(6.724)                          (11.490) 
[0.000]                          [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.963 S.E.=1762.95 D.W.=1.619 
 
(B.5) Disposable Income 
LOG(YD_JPN)=-8.217248294 
(-4.361) 
[0.000] 
+1.10772895271*LOG(PGDP11_JPN*GDP11_JPN 
(10.437) 
[0.000] 
-(TAX1_JPN_SA+TAX2_JPN+TAX3_JPN+TR_JPN)-DD_JPN) 
(2.884) 
[0.005] 
+[AR(1)=0.4219310745,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2000Q1 2016Q4"] 
(5.359) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.900 S.E.=0.0118 D.W.=2.151 
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(B.6) Depreciation (Real) 
LOG(DD_JPN/PGDP11_JPN)=0.336441467612*LOG(K05_JPN(-6)) 
(316.380) 
[0.000] 
+[AR(1)=0.956477591954,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2000Q1 2016Q4"] 
(29.299) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.968 S.E.=0.010 D.W.=2.191 
 
(B.7) Labor Force 
LOG(L_JPN_SA)=-0.155441063594+0.080285839178*LOG(GDP11_JPN) 
(-1.065)         (4.667) 
[0.291]          [0.000] 
-0.00526852217268*LOG(K05_JPN(-4))+0.908758034977*LOG(L_JPN_SA(-1)) 
(-0.430)                         (21.907) 
[0.669]                          [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.985 S.E.=0.003 D.W.=2.212 
 
(B.8) Wage Rate 
LOG(WAGE_RATE_JPN)=-0.746772694431  
(-1.772) 
[0.081] 
+0.168529342246*LOG(GDP11_JPN(-1)/L_JPN_SA(-1)) 
(2.815) 
[0.007] 
+0.34780157233*LOG(PGDP11_JPN(-3)) 
(3.752) 
[0.000] 
+0.338824044813*LOG(WAGE_RATE_JPN(-4)) 
(3.061) 
[0.003] 
+[AR(1)=0.771077056717,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2000Q1 2017Q1"] 
(9.426) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.941 S.E.=0.007 D.W.=1.889 
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(B.9) Capital  
K05_JPN =1.00354908898*(K05_JPN(-1) +I11_JPN+DD_JPN/PGDP11_JPN) 
(3461.525) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.999 S.E.=2742196. D.W.=1.696 
 
Monetary Sector  
(B.10) Loans of Depository Banks from Central Bank 
LC_JPN=1847.52982691+0.0614055916634*LB_JPN 
(0.004)        (0.588) 
[0.997]        [0.559] 
-127.016588859*(R_S_JPN(-2)-R_D_JPN(-2))/R_S_JPN(-1) 
(-0.104) 
[0.917] 
-1830.13393059*(R_DT_JPN(-2))/R_S_JPN(-1)-199947.472083*DM00Q1_17Q4 
(-0.245)                                  (-5.556) 
[0.807]                                   [0.000] 
+ [AR(1)=0.911391242,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2000Q3 2016Q4"] 
(17.605) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.964 S.E.=30081.96 D.W.=2.465 
 
(B.11) Lending of Depository Banks to Private sectors 
LOG(LB_JPN)=13.5676608094 
(16.673) 
[0.000] 
+0.0884609014423*LOG(IPF11_JPN(-4)+IPH11_JPN(-4)) 
(1.135) 
[0.262] 
+0.0512102295042*LOG(LC_JPN(-2)+CT1_JPN(-2)+CT2_JPN(-2)+CT3_JPN(-2)) 
(2.272) 
[0.027] 
-0.0289762107245*R_S_JPN/R_L_JPN(-1) +0.0170718979549*DM08Q4_09Q1  
(-0.839)                               (4.758) 
[0.405]                                [0.000] 
 +[AR(1)=0.978544688097,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2003Q1 2017Q1"] 
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(36.465) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.978 S.E.=0.008 D.W.=1.445 
 
(B.12) Money Supply 
LOG(M2_JPN)=5.53246598416+0.170572884313*LOG(MRS_JPN(-4)) 
(2.462)        (9.932) 
[0.017]        [0.000] 
+0.513652899842*LOG(LB_JPN) 
(3.254) 
[0.002] 
Adj.R2=0.823 S.E.=0.048 D.W.=0.637 
 
(B.13) Short-term Interest Rate 
R_S_JPN=-0.0118140365167+0.0954354190102*R_M_JPN(-1)+2.52732417778*R_DT_JPN 
(-1.070)         (1.945)                      (21.268) 
[0.289]          [0.056]                      [0.000] 
+[AR(1)=0.50422743373,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2000Q2 2017Q1"] 
Adj.R2=0.968 S.E.=0.030 D.W.=1.696 
 
(B.14) Discount Rate  
R_D_JPN=0.269789497607+0.95500048406*R_M_JPN 
(4.799)         (22.067) 
[0.000]         [0.000] 
+[AR(1)=0.940452257824,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2000Q1 2017Q1"] 
(23.536) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.952 S.E.=0.041 D.W.=2.010 
 
(B.15) Lending Rate 
R_L_JPN=1.09339182261+0.170336898266*R_GB_JPN(-1) 
(4.428)        (3.462) 
[0.000]        [0.001] 
+[AR(1)=0.982269034473,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2000Q2 2017Q1"] 
Adj.R2=0.967 S.E.=0.060 D.W.=2.106 
 
30 
 
(B.16) Long-term Interest Rate 
R_GB_JPN=3.70975352645-3.66783490686e-05*M2_JPN/PGDP11_JPN 
(4.540)                       (-3.294) 
[0.000]                       [0.002] 
+0.563734694541*R_S_JPN+0.402083900874*@PCH(INDEX_TOPIX)  
(1.308)                   (1.902)   
[0.196]                   [0.062]   
+[AR(1)=0.853641644347,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2000Q2 2017Q1"] 
(14.727) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.922 S.E.=0.144 D.W.=1.531 
 
(B.17) Price-to-Earnings Ratio (P/E Ratio) 
LOG(PER_NON_JPN)=3.83037598027+1.68022680997*DLOG(GDP11_JPN(-4)) 
(4.191)        (0.656) 
[0.000]        [0.514] 
+0.0495479127532*LOG(PER_NON_JPN(-4))  
(0.650) 
[0.519] 
+[AR(1)=0.948289886032,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2001Q2 2017Q1"] 
(22.050) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.898 S.E.=0.343 D.W.=1.570 
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B.2 The United States  
Macroeconomic Sector 
(B.18) Consumption (Real)  
CP09_USA/POP_USA=0.00128840769754 
(-3.806) 
[0.000] 
+0.547571008698*YD_USA/(POP_USA*(PGDP09_USA/100)) 
(8.223) 
[0.000] 
+0.444656906691*CP09_USA(-4)/POP_USA(-4) 
(6.612) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.993 S.E.=0.000 D.W.=0.281 
 
(B.19) Investment (Real) 
LOG(I09_USA)=1.27559733638+0.0232830595194*LOG(GDP09_USA(-2)) 
(1.397)        (0.173) 
[1.656]        [0.863] 
-0.0221570402876*R_GB_USA(-4)+0.822940559904*LOG(I09_USA(-4)) 
(-2.982)                        (13.266) 
[0.004]                         [0.000] 
-0.140569183581*DM08Q4_10Q4 
(-8.138)      
[0.000]       
Adj.R2=0.972 S.E.=0.047 D.W.=0.307 
 
(B.20) Export (Real) 
EX09_USA=-2049.66642479+160.770226895*LOG(WT_SA)  
(-7.002)       (7.187) 
[0.000]        [0.000] 
+71.9717320025*LOG(PWT10_SA(-4)/PGDP09_USA(-4)) 
(1.784) 
[0.078] 
+0.807030884462*EX09_USA(-2)-202.171766121*(DM09Q1+DM09Q2) 
(29.300)                     (-7.625) 
[0.000]                      [0.000] 
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Adj.R2=0.992 S.E.=35.725 D.W.=0.924 
 
(B.21) Import (Real) 
IM09_USA=-703.960300382+0.124844256416*GDP09_USA 
(-7.529)       (9.126) 
[0.000]        [0.000] 
+207.912382243*LOG(PGDP09_USA(-4)/PIM09_USA(-4)) 
(3.775)          
[0.000] 
+0.505548499992*IM09_USA(-2)-253.169776275*(DM09Q1+DM09Q2) 
(9.963)                       (-9.505) 
[0.000]                       [0.000]    
Adj.R2=0.998 S.E.=35.186 D.W.=0.626 
 
(B.22) Disposable Income 
YD_USA=-219.074012981 
(-5.879) 
[0.000] 
+0.965015929011*((PGDP09_USA/100)*GDP09_USA-
(TAX1_USA+TAX2_USA+TAX3_USA-TR_USA)-
DD09_USA*(PGDP09_USA/100)) 
(258.115) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.998 S.E.=126.435 D.W.=0.638 
 
(B.23) Depreciation (Real) 
DD09_USA=0.156775811286*KK09_USA(-4)-248.434921183*DM08Q1_09Q2 
           (155.699)                     (-5.946) 
[0.000]                       [0.000] 
-40.296036036*@SEAS(1)+22.1961379053*@SEAS(4) 
           (-1.818)                 (0.994) 
[0.072]                  [0.322] 
Adj.R2=0.965 S.E.=97.422 D.W.=9.235 
 
(B.24) Labor Force 
LOG(L_USA)=0.540413805419+0.0695199362374*LOG(GDP09_USA) 
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(2.802)          
[0.006]          
-0.0318535373752*LOG(KK09_USA(-4))+0.924113586204*LOG(L_USA(-1)) 
(-6.607)                             (39.366) 
[0.000]                              [0.000] 
-0.0157358777426*DM09Q1+0.00265931128749*@SEAS(1) 
(-4.611)                  (3.695) 
[0.000]                   [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.998 S.E.=0.003 D.W.=1.319 
 
(B.25) Wage Rate 
 
LOG(WAGE_RATE_USA)=-1.98475633034+1.44289323265*LOG(GDP09_USA(-4)/L_USA(-4)) 
(-4.428)        (19.271)       
[0.000]         [0.000]  
+0.518412360733*LOG(PGDP09_USA) 
(8.550) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.997 S.E.=0.015 D.W.=0.467 
 
(B.26) Capital  
KK_USA/PGDP09_USA-(KK_USA(-4)/PGDP09_USA(-4))=1.25848852041 
(1.302) 
[0.198] 
+0.013653978003*(I09_USA-DD09_USA)  
(4.739) 
[0.000] 
+[AR(1)=0.752431375737,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2000Q1 2016Q4"] 
(7.797) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.867 S.E.=1.896 D.W.=2.060 
 
Monetary Sector  
(B.27) Lending of Depository Banks to Private sectors 
LB_USA=-60119609.6039+6859245.07515*LOG(I09_USA(-4)) 
(-10.989)      (8.409) 
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[0.000]        [0.000] 
+965739.874897*LOG(A_LN+A_CG) 
(6.353) 
[0.000] 
-1796526.30401*R_S_USA/R_L_USA(-1) 
(-3.184) 
[0.002] 
Adj.R2=0.855 S.E.=523884.1 D.W.=0.121 
 
(B.28) Money Supply 
M2_USA_SA=1646.58343762+0.000988630963668*MRS_USA+0.000791109223839*LB_USA 
(6.432)        (20.330)                    (16.144) 
[0.000]        [0.000]                     [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.986 S.E.=283.165 D.W.=0.221 
 
(B.29) Short-term Interest Rate 
R_S_USA=-0.0235230475373+0.963819647635*R_M_USA+0.149001827503*R_DC_USA(-2) 
(-1.287)         (21.598)                  (2.219) 
[0.208]          [0.000]                   [0.034] 
Adj.R2=0.967 S.E.=0.047 D.W.=1.032 
 
(B.30) Discount Rate  
R_D_USA =0.650395000814+1.05545019766*R_M_USA-0.31926703244*DM09Q1_Q4 
(16.657)         (61.656)                (-2.729) 
[0.000]          [0.000]                 [0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.986 S.E.=0.222 D.W.=0.208 
 
(B.31) Lending Rate 
R_L_USA=3.38571104083+0.301746187763*R_GB_USA 
(2.093)        (2.575)       
[0.041]        [0.013]        
+[AR(1)=0.961590044375,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2003Q1 2017Q3"] 
(27.967) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.959 S.E.=0.348 D.W.=0.639 
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(B.32) Long-term Interest Rate 
R_GB_USA=5.5267305013-0.0488501996479*M2_USA_SA/PGDP09_USA 
(9.385)        (-8.386) 
[0.000]        [0.000] 
+0.143339137758*R_S_USA(-2)+0.0762762828759*PER_SP500 
(2.446)                      (3.628) 
[0.018]                      [0.001]  
+[MA(1)=0.727992795853,UNCOND,ESTSMPL="2003Q1 2017Q3"] 
(6.045) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.926 S.E.=0.284 D.W.=1.669 
 
(B.33) Price-to-Earnings Ratio (P/E Ratio) 
PER_SP500=-2.37245419837+0.00026764986143*GDP09_USA 
(-0.936)        (1.892) 
[0.353]         [0.063] 
+0.932352666059*PER_SP500(-1) 
(29.228) 
[0.000] 
Adj.R2=0.933 S.E.=1.406 D.W.=1.258 
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Appendix C. Balance Sheet  
 
Table 10 and Table 11 represent the balance sheet of the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve. 
The items which are employed as endogenous variables into the financial model are in bold texts. The 
relations of identities based on balance sheets is explained in Kosaka (2016) 
. 
Table 10. Balance Sheet of Bank of Japan 
Assets  Liabilities  
Claims on Nonresidents 
Claims on Government 
Claims on Depository  
Claims on Other Financial Corporations 
Claims on Other Sectors  
 
 
 
 
Monetary Base 
    Cash Currency Issued 
    Current Account Balances 
Labilities to Nonresidents 
Liabilities to Government 
Other Items (Net) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Balance Sheet of the Federal Reserve 
Assets  Liabilities  
Reserve Bank credit 
   Securities held outright 
       U.S. Treasury securities 
            Bills 
            Notes and bonds, nominal 
Notes and bonds, inflation-indexed 
Inflation compensation 
       Federal agency debt securities 
       Mortgage-backed securities 
   Unamortized premiums on securities held outright 
   Unamortized discounts on securities held outright 
   Repurchase agreements 
   Loans 
       Primary credit 
       Secondary credit 
       Seasonal credit 
       Other credit extensions 
   Net portfolio holdings of Maiden Lane LLC 
   Float 
   Central bank liquidity swaps 
   Other Federal Reserve assets 
Foreign currency denominated assets 
Gold stock 
Special drawing rights certificate account 
Treasury currency outstanding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Currency in circulation 
Reverse repurchase agreements 
   Foreign official and international accounts 
   Others 
Treasury cash holdings 
Deposits with F.R. Banks, other than reserve balances 
   Term deposits held by depository institutions 
   U.S. Treasury, General Account 
   Foreign official 
   Other 
Other liabilities and capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total factors, other than reserve balances, 
absorbing reserve funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total factors supplying reserve funds  Reserve balances with Federal Reserve Banks  
 
 
 
